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JENNIFER JOHNSON*

What's Good for the Goose? A Critical Essay on
"Best Practices" for Private Firms

I.

INTRODUCTION

corporate scandals of the past
few years, the federal government has obtained unprecedented control over the
internal management of American public corporations. While the regulation of
internal corporate governance has historically been the exclusive province of state
law, federal mandates now require independent directors to play the central role in
the oversight of public companies. In spite of scant or even contradictory evidence
that independent boards increase shareholder value,' Congress, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Self Regulatory Organizations (SROs) have
mandated a greater role for independent directors in publicly traded firms.' Furthermore, corporate ratings agencies view board independence as a key factor when
ranking the quality of corporate governance of rated companies Implicit in this
IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT LARGE AND VERY PUBLIC

.

Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School.

1.

See COLIN B. CARTER & JAY W. LORSCH, BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD: DESIGNING CORPORATE

BOARDS FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 95-98 (2003) (suggesting that outsiders have neither the time nor the knowledge to effectively monitor managers); Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critiqueof the NYSE's DirectorIndependence
Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 370, 386- 96 (2002) (reviewing empirical studies of corporate performance
and independent directors); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence
and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain
Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921, 921-40 (1999) (suggesting
that studies are inconclusive as to whether boards with a majority of independent directors make the most
effective decisions for shareholders); John F. Olson & Michael T. Adams, Composing a Balanced and Effective
Board to Meet New Governance Mandates, 59 Bus. LAW. 421, 444-52 (2004) (arguing that independent board
members, while perhaps more objective, may not be well informed). But see Reena Aggarwal & Rohan Williamson, Did New Regulations Target the Relevant Corporate Governance Attributes? (McDonough Sch. of Bus., Geo.
Univ. Feb. 12, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=859264 (finding positive correlation between firm
value and governance mandates).
2. The federalization of the monitoring board is perhaps the culmination of a trend that has been underway in public corporations for a number of years. See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to
Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 11 (2002) ("The monitoring
board model has come into standard usage by large public corporations pursuant to recommendations over the
last twenty years by, among others, the American Bar Association's Committee on Corporate Law of the Section of Corporation, Banking & Business Law, the SEC, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance.") (footnotes omitted).
3. See, e.g., Press Release, Institutional S'holder Servs., Enhanced Corporate Governance Tools Now Available (Apr. 14, 2005), available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/CGIPRO41505.pdf. For a critical perspective on
the one size fits all approach of the corporate ratings agencies, see Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Indus-
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model is the assumption that the independent director will be an effective monitor
of otherwise shirking or conflicted managers and thus increase shareholder wealth.4
This theory elevates the monitoring or policing role of corporate boards to a position far above other vital board functions such as policy-making and advising.5
While most requirements of the new federal regime only apply to public companies, many provisions, including the requirement of independent directors, are now
touted as "best practices" for private firms and non-profits as well. 6 This paper
suggests that this trend is ill-advised given the different roles that outside directors
play in closely-held business entities. A decision by private enterprises to employ
outside directors should be informed by quite different considerations than those
that led to the enactment of the federal standards. Whatever the virtues of independent directors as effective board members of public companies, this is not a situation where what is good for the goose is necessarily good for the gander. Outside
directors of private firms rarely perform the policing role envisioned by Congress
and the regulatory agencies. In the private realm, the primary function of a board is
advising, not monitoring. The federal mandates constraining the definition of director independence may unduly hamper the development of many private entities.
Unlike the emerging federal regulatory scheme, state statutes rarely dictate board
composition. State law provides incentives, however, for corporations to utilize independent directors by providing more deferential or limited judicial review of
certain decisions made by independent board members. The state law definitions of
"independence" are contextual and do not necessarily mimic the federal rules. Like
their federal counterparts, however, the state definitions often miss the mark in
dealing with private entities.

try, 32 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2007); Lynn A. Stout, Why Should ISS Be the New Master of the Corporate
Governance Universe, CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dow JONES), Jan. 4, 2006, at 14.
4. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 JL. & ECON. 301, 304
(1983).
5. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 381 (noting the managerial and networking functions of corporate
boards); Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Dual Board and Board
Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91, 93, 98- 104 (1997) (distinguishing monitoring role of board from
"relational" roles); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and PoliticalOrigins of the Corporate Board of Directors,
33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 168-69 (2004) (outlining the historical function of the board and arguing that the
monitoring role of the board has the least support in the historical origins of the corporate board); Donald C.
Langevoort, The Human Nature of CorporateBoards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEo. L.J. 797, 801-03 (2001) (describing board functions as monitoring, legitimizing and providing service).
6. See, e.g., Joseph Anthony, Private companies: 4 lessons from Sarbanes-Oxley Act, MICROSOFT SMALL
Bus. CTR., Mar. 1, 2007, http://www.microsoft.com/smallbusiness/resources/finance/legal-expenses/privatecompanies_4_lessons fromsarbanes_oxleyact.mspx (suggesting truly independent boards for private companies); Robert Half Int'l, Inc., The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on PrivateBusiness: Are the New Rules Giving Rise to
a Universal Standard?, July 2003, http://www.fei.org/download/RHI_9_12_03.pdf (suggesting that private companies adopt SOX governance reforms as a best practice). For an argument that "mechanical adherence to best
practices" does not necessarily lead to better performance of firms, see SRIDHAR R. ARCOT & VALENTINA G.
BRUNO, ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL, AFTER ALL: EVIDENCE FROM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=887947.
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This Article evaluates the appropriate definition and role of independent directors in the context of private companies and suggests that true independence is not
only illusory in such circumstances, but perhaps counterproductive to the best interests of the firm. This Article claims that for private entities, the choice of individuals to serve as outside directors should not be dictated by federal concerns, nor
should the decisions of nominally independent directors in private companies automatically enjoy the presumptions and protections now afforded under state law.
First, the Article examines the varying definitions of independent directors
under Sarbanes-Oxley, the SRO listing standards, the common law of Delaware and
the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA). 7 Next, it analyzes the effectiveness of
these definitions in the context of private entities and argues that most definitions
are either over or under-inclusive for the roles we now expect board members to
play.' Finally, this Article analyzes the appropriate role of outside directors in private corporations and argues that "best practices" in this world should not mirror
the current universe of public entities.9
II.

A.

THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

Sarbanes-Oxley

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20020 (SOX), which primarily applies to public companies," may have provided the catalyst for the increased mandates relating to independent directors. SOX itself, however, merely requires that public companies
establish board audit committees composed entirely of independent directors.' 2 To
be considered independent under SOX, a director may not accept compensation
other than in her capacity as a member of the audit committee, and may not be an
affiliated person of the issuer or any of its subsidiaries. 3 Furthermore, SOX mandates that the SEC prohibit the national securities exchanges and associations from
listing issuers who do not comply with these audit requirements.14

7. See infra Part 1I.
8. See infra Part Ill.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
IL. See generally id. (applying most of the provisions of the Act to public companies). A few sections of
SOX apply to private as well as public companies. See id. § 802 (criminal liability for document destruction);
id. § 803 (securities law liabilities not dischargeable in bankruptcy); id. § 806 (liability for retaliation against
whistleblowers).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201(3), 78j-l(m)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2006).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B). However, the SEC is empowered to provide exemptions for specific relationships that otherwise would jeopardize a director's independence. See id. § 78j-l(m)(3)(C).
14. Id. § 78j-l(m)(1)(A). The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and other SROs have required a majority
of audit committee members to be independent since 1977. See In re New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 13,346, 11 SEC Docket 1945 (Mar. 9, 1977); see also AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.05 cmt. a (1992) (recommending that large publicly held
corporations should be required to have independent audit committees).
VOL. 2 NO. 2 2007
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The SEC's implementation of the first SOX director independence requirement
prohibits the payment of any consulting or other compensatory fee either to the
director herself or to indirect recipients such as close family members, or financial,
consulting, or legal businesses associated with the issuer of which the director is a
partner, member, or officer. 5 This rule polices intentional evasion of the independence requirement, but the SEC notes that the rule is not meant to extend so far as
to impinge the independence of directors who are non-managing members or mere
employees of businesses associated with an issuer. 6 With regards to prohibited affiliations," the SEC promulgated separate tests for non-investment company issuers
and investment company issuers. For non-investment company issuers, the SEC
has identified an independence-destroying affiliation between a director and an
issuer or its subsidiary when that director is under the control of the issuer or
subsidiary, or is a member of the executive management team. 8 For investment
company issuers to be considered independent, the SEC has simply ruled that a
director may not "be an 'interested person' of the issuer as defined in section
2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act of 1940."' 9 Under the SEC rules, share
ownership does not automatically disqualify a director as independent and there is
a safe harbor for share ownership under 10 percent."
B.

NYSE

Before the recent spate of federal corporate reform activity, the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) required that each listed issuer have a "qualified audit committee" consisting solely of "independent" directors." The NYSE listing rules previ15. Listing Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10A-3(b)(l)(ii)(A), (e)(8) (2005).
16. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act Release No. 8,220, Exchange
Act Release No. 47,654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, 18,791-92 (Apr. 16, 2003). While generally narrowing the first
SOX independence requirement, the SEC determined that fixed retirement benefits that are not contingent on
future service do not preclude the independent status of a director serving on the board of an issuer that might
owe him such benefits. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(ii)(A).
17. SOX itself does not define "affiliated person," and the SEC has determined that it can define this term
through its general rulemaking powers granted in SOX section 3(a). 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10A-3(a), (e)(1).
18. Id. §§ 240.10A-3(b)(l)(ii), (e)(l). The SEC regulations set forth some general exceptions to the audit
committee requirements, including exceptions to the non-affiliation requirement for non-investment company
issuers, for newly registered issuers and for directors serving on the boards of multiple affiliated companies in a
strictly independent capacity on each. The SEC states that it does not intend to grant additional exceptions in
individual circumstances, noting that "given the policy and purposes behind the SOX, as well as to maintain
consistency and to ease administration of the requirements by the [national securities exchanges and national
securities associations (SROs)], we do not intend to entertain exemptions or waivers for particular relationships
on a case-by-case basis." Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release No.
47,654, 68 Fed. Reg. at 18,791-92, 18,795.
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)()(iii)(B). The SEC notes that these rules are"tailored to capture the broad
range of affiliations with investment advisers, principal underwriters, and others that are relevant to 'independence' in the case of investment companies." Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 18,794.
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(e)(1)(ii)(A)(1).
21. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 303.01(A), (B)(2)(a) (1999) [hereinafter Pre-SOX NYSE
Manual].
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ously defined "independence" as "free from any relationship that, in the opinion of
[an issuer's] board of directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent
judgment as a committee member." 2
The NYSE's current listing requirements, which were promulgated contemporaneously with the congressional activity that resulted in SOX, extend beyond congressional and SEC mandates with respect to independent directors. NYSE listed
companies must now have a majority of independent directors that meet at least
once each year in executive session,23 audit committees composed entirely of independent directors,24 and compensation and nominating/corporate governance
committees composed solely of independent directors.2" Under current NYSE standards, each company must affirmatively determine and identify which of its directors are independent and disclose the basis for that determination." Despite this
flexible approach, the NYSE also imposes several additional requirements that prohibit specific familial, financial, and professional relationships between the director
and the issuer27 and set the threshold of disqualifying (non-director fee) compensa-

22. In re NYSE, Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, 11 SEC Docket 1945 (Mar. 9, 1977); see also Pre-SOX
NYSE Manual, supra note 21, § 303A.02 (listing independence requirements of audit committee members).
23. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 303A.01, .03 (2003) [hereinafter Post-SOX NYSE Manual].
Proposed changes to NYSE listing standards require that executive sessions of only independent (as opposed to
only non-management) directors be presided over by an independent director. Self-Regulatory Organizations,
File No. SR-NYSE-2005-81 (June 20, 2007), available at http:/apps.nyse.com/commdata/publ9b4.nsf/docs/
0345D4493935539A85257300007745F7/$FILE/NYSE-2005-81%20A-2.pdf [hereinafter NYSE Proposed Rules].
24.

Post-SOX NYSE Manual, supra note 23, §§ 303A.06, .07(b).

25. Id. §§ 303A.04, .05. "Controlled companies," defined as companies where more than half of the voting
power is concentrated in one shareholder or shareholder group, need not have a majority of independent
directors or nominating and compensation committees comprised of independent directors. Id. § 303A.00.
Proposed changes to NYSE listing requirements clarify that "controlled companies" are those in which more
than half the voting power for the election of directors is held by an individual shareholder or group. NYSE
Proposed Rules, supra note 23, § 303A.00. While not itself requiring nominating/governance committees consisting of independent directors, the SEC requires disclosure of the composition and operating method of such
committees. See Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications Between Security Holders and Board of Directors, Securities Act Release No. 8,340, Exchange Act Release No. 48,825, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,262, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,992 (Nov. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/finalI33-8340.htm.
26. Post-SOX NYSE Manual, supra note 23, § 303A.02(a). Proposed amendments to the NYSE listing
standards, however, would eliminate the disclosure requirement, NYSE Proposed Rules, supra note 23,
§ 303A.02(a), in light of amended Item 407 of Regulation S-K, which has similar and sometimes higher disclosure standards. See NYSE Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 4-5.
27. Post-SOX NYSE Manual, supra note 23, § 303A.02(b); see also NYSE and NASDAQ Order Approving
Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745, 68 Fed. Reg.
64,154, 157-58, 164 (Nov. 12, 2003) (discussing the definition of independent director). Audit committee
members must also satisfy the requirements of Rule 10A-3 under the Exchange Act to be considered independent. Post-SOX NYSE Manual, supra note 23, § 303A.06 cmt. However, this is largely an unnecessary addition
given that the listing standards are more stringent than the statutory requirements. The NYSE listing requirements reflect the SEC's distinction regarding investment company issuers, defining the director of such a company as "independent if he or she is not an 'interested person' of the company, as defined in Section 2(a)(19) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940." Id. § 303A.00.
VOL. 2 NO. 2 2007
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tion at $100,000 per year.2" The official comment to this section notes that significant stock ownership alone does not bar a finding of independence.29
C. NASDAQ
Like the NYSE, NASDAQ's requirements for independent directors experienced a
major transition as part of the Enron-era corporate governance reforms. Previously, NASDAQ simply defined an independent director as a "person other than an
executive officer or employee of the company or any other individual having a
relationship which, in the opinion of the issuer's board of directors, would interfere
with the exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a
director."3 Furthermore, NASDAQ excluded from its definition of independence
employees of the issuer (or their immediate family members) who were terminated
within the last three years or who had received substantial non-retirement, nondiscretionary income from the issuer; principals of for-profit organizations that
had done substantial business with the issuer; and any director of another company
where one of the issuer's directors served as a member of that other company's
compensation committee.31 The revised NASDAQ independent director requirements closely parallel those of the NYSE. 32 NASDAQ now has a broad prohibition
against any "relationship which ... would interfere with the [director's] exercise of
independent judgment."33 Fleshing out this broad prohibition are several additional
specific elements of independence that, like those of the NYSE, guard against specific familial, financial, and professional relationships between the director and the
issuer.34 NASDAQ sets the disqualifying direct compensation level at $60,000. 3"

28. Post-SOX NYSE Manual, supra note 23, § 303A.02(b)(ii). The proposed changes raise the threshold to
$120,000 per year, Id., in line with SEC rules for disclosing related party transactions pursuant to Reg. S-K,
Item 404. See Securities Act Release No. 33-8,732A (Aug. 29, 2006).
29. Post-SOX NYSE Manual, supra note 23, § 303A.02(a) cmt. Stock ownership exceeding 10 percent,
however, may disqualify a director from audit committee service under SEC regulations implementing SOX.
SEC Listing Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10A-3(b)(t)(ii)(B), 240.10A3(e)(I)(ii)(A)(1) (2005).
30. NASDAQ, Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 4200(a)(15), 4200-1(a) (2005).
31. Id.§§4200-1(a)(14)(A)-(E).
32. The SEC considered the SRO's listing standard requests simultaneously. NYSE and NASDAQ Order
Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 64,154.
33. NASDAQ, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 4200(a)(15).
34. Id.; see also NYSE and NASDAQ Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate
Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 64,161-63 (discussing NASDAQ independent director rule changes).
35. NASDAQ, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 4200. NASDAQ filed a recent amendment to increase the
disqualifying compensation from $60,000 to $120,000, in order to conform its director independence rules to
the related person disclosure thresholds of Item 404 of Regulation S-K. See Self-Regulatory Organizations,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-54,797, File No. SR-NASDAQ-2006-041 (Nov. 20, 2006). (The NASDAQ interpretive guidance states that the current threshold is at $100,000 rather than the $60,000 contained in the listing
standard itself. NASDAQ Manual IM-4200, available at http://nasdaq.complinet.com/nasdaq/display/display.
html?rbid=1705&elementid=18.). Prior to this November 2006 filing, the SEC noticed a proposed NASDAQ
Rule change that would otherwise bring its definition of independence more in line with that used by the
NYSE, primarily by eliminating from the definition of "independent director" any director who receives non-
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NASDAQ listed companies must have audit committees that adhere both to NASDAQ's own independence requirements as well as those mandated by SOX.36 Like
the NYSE, NASDAQ's listing requirements concerning independent directors apply
beyond the scope of the SEC's audit committee regulations and require the board
of directors to be composed of a majority of independent directors (with an exception for controlled companies). Under NASDAQ rules, only the independent directors determine the compensation of executive officers, and only independent
directors either directly nominate or select a nomination committee to nominate
directors.37
D. State Definitions of Independence
Under state law, the issue of board composition is largely unregulated." State statutes do not regulate the optimal number of directors, board committee structures,
or the qualifications of directors.39 Such decisions are relegated to the stakeholders
in the enterprise, and state statutes defer to private judgment on the relative merits
of an independent board versus a board that includes inside directors. However,
while there are no state statutory requirements mandating director independence,
there are incentives under state law for companies to utilize outside, independent
directors. The foremost incentive is embodied in the business judgment rule, under
which courts presume that board actions are a result of good faith decisions made
in the best interest of the company.4" To enjoy this presumption and limited judicial review of board decisions, however, the decision makers must be disinterested
and independent." Also, independent board members can function under state law
compensatory loans from the corporation, as well as any director who has served as an interim executive officer
for more than one year. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-54,333 (Aug. 18, 2006).
36. NASDAQ, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 4350(d)(2)(A).
37. Id. § 4350(c). These edicts give more power to independent directors than do the analogous NYSE
rules that permit the board as a whole to override committee decisions regarding compensation and nomination committees. Consistent with SEC and NYSE requirements, the NASDAQ listing requirements use a different test for investment company issuers, specifically asking whether the director "is an 'interested person' of the
company as defined in Section 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, other than in his or her
capacity as a member of the board of directors or any board committee." Id. § 4200(a)(15)(G).
38. This paper will reference both the Delaware corporate statutes and the Model Business Corporation
Act (MBCA). Delaware is home to more than half of all U.S. publicly traded companies and approximately 58
percent of Fortune 500 companies. See State of Delaware Corporations Division, http://www.state.de.us/corp/
default.sgtml. The MBCA has been adopted in some form by thirty-five states. JEFFREY D. BAUMANN, ALAN R.
PALMITER & ELLIOT J. WEISS, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 31 (5th ed. 2003).
39. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2005); see also Roberta S.
Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of
Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 94-96 (2005) (describing efforts of the SEC to regulate corporate
governance in situations where states did not act). In 2005, the Committee on Corporate Laws amended the
MBCA to provide that in public corporations, the board's oversight responsibilities included attention to "the
composition of the board and its committees, taking into account the important role of independent directors." MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(c)(8). The MBCA does not however impose specific independence
requirements.
40. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
41. Id.
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to validate conflict of interest transactions, or at least to permit a more lenient
standard of judicial review. In general terms, conflict of interest transactions that
involve self-dealing transactions between insiders and their corporations are subject
to judicial review under the "entire fairness test," where the defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the transaction was fair to the corporation." However,
under defined circumstances, if a committee of independent directors approves the
transaction or decision at issue, there will be a less exacting standard of judicial
review, or at a minimum a shifting of the burden of proof.43
For example, under the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), so called
"qualified directors," who can roughly be defined as "independent directors" under
the new federal mandates, can ratify a defined conflict of interest transaction between a non-qualified director or officer and the corporation." Such ratification
completely removes the transaction from judicial review." Under Delaware law46
and the earlier version of MBCA section 8.31 that is still in force in most states,47
ratification by independent directors of a conflict of interest transaction between
insiders and the corporation at least shifts the burden to plaintiffs to prove that the
transaction was unfair. 41 Under recent interpretations of the Delaware statute, however, independent director ratification results in only limited judicial review pursuant to the business judgment rule. 49 Director approval of transactions involving

42. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-15 (Del. 1983) (applying entire fairness test to a
merger).
43. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 366 n.34 (Del. 1993); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d
218, 221-22 (Del. 1976) (holding that an interested transaction may be protected if ratified by disinterested or
independent shareholders); see also In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 606-07, 614-17
(Del. Ch. 2005) (advocating application of business judgment rule review if controlling shareholder transaction
is approved by disinterested directors and minority shareholders).
44.
45.

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.62.

Id. § 8.61(b)(1).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2006).
47. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 8-401-06 (Supp. 2005); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1984)
(amended 1988).
48. See, e.g., Sobek v. Stonitsch, 995 F. Supp. 918 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (describing burden shift under a Model
Act statute). See also Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1154 (Del. Ch. 1994) (holding that
compliance with Delaware section 144 shifts the burden of proving fairness to plaintiffs).
49. Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 2006) (holding that a court will
review an interested director transaction under the business judgment rule if the transaction was approved by a
majority of disinterested directors); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) (complying with
ratification provision of section 144 results in a business judgment rule review). There was some apparent
confusion conveyed in earlier opinions of the Delaware Court of Chancery concerning the appropriate standard of review of a transaction that has been ratified by disinterested directors. Compare Cooke v. Oolie, No.
CIV. A. 11134, 1997 WL 367034 (Del. Ch. June 23, 1997), with Cooke v. Oolie, No. CIV. A. 11134, 2000 WL
710199 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2000) (first stating that the fairness test applied with a burden shift, then subsequently stating that the appropriate review was under the business judgment rule). See also Benihana of Tokyo,
Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 185 (Del. Ch. 2005) (stating that section 144 ratification only impacted the
voidability rule and did not implicate which standard of review should apply).
46.
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conflicts with a controlling shareholder, however, are usually reviewed under a fairness test. 50
Unlike the rule-based federal standards, state laws typically define independence
contextually on a case-by-case basis. Not surprisingly, most of the common law
development in this arena has been worked out in the courts of Delaware in litigation involving public corporations. Consistent with federal definitions, the definition of independence under Delaware law has traditionally focused upon the
presence of material financial ties between the interested party and the director
whose independence is at issue."' For example, in In re eBay Shareholders Litigation, 2 the Delaware Court of Chancery emphasized that the directors' independence was questionable because of "huge financial benefits" the directors received
as compensation for their board service.53 Other disqualifying relationships under
Delaware precedent include familial ties to an interested party or lack of independence due to some other reason, such as domination or control. 4 In two recent
cases, the Delaware courts have recognized that, under the right circumstances,
non-financial ties between interested parties and directors can impinge on independence. In the In re Oracle Corporation Derivative Litigation, the Oracle Board
appointed a two member special litigation committee (SLC) to assess whether Oracle should pursue insider trading allegations against certain corporate insiders.55
In spite of the engagement of independent financial and legal advisors and an
extensive investigation that culminated in a 1,100 page report, 6 Vice Chancellor Strine held that the SLC had not met its burden of establishing its independence due to the interwoven relations that the committee members and
the named defendants shared with Stanford University.57 In Beam v. Martha
50. Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (holding that approval of a
merger transaction by a committee of independent directors, plus other factors, can shift the burden of the
fairness issue onto the plaintiff); see also In re PNB Holding Co. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 28-N, 2006 WL
2403999 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006) (affirming that Kahn mandates special rules to govern controlling shareholder transactions).
51.
In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 936 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("[Mluch of our law focuses the
bias inquiry on whether there are economically material ties between the interested party and the director
whose impartiality is questioned, treating the possible effect on one's personal wealth as the key to the independence inquiry."); see also Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996), abrogated by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (stating that a material financial interest can demonstrate that a board was not independent and disinterested when it considered a stockholder's demand that the board take up a corporation's
claim); Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (holding that there is reasonable doubt as to the
directors' independence because of their financial interests); 1. Robert Brown, Disloyalty Without Limits, "Independent" Directors and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 Ky. L.J. 53 (2006) (explaining the financial
materiality standard under Delaware precedents).
52. In re eBay, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. C.A. 19988-NC, 2004 WL 253521 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 2004).
53. Id. at *2-4.
54. Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216.
55. In re Oracle, 824 A.2d at 923.
56. Id. at 923-25.
57. Id. at 942-48. The SLC committee members, Hector Garcia-Molina and Joseph Grundfest, were both
tenured professors at Stanford University. Id. at 923-24. The trading defendants included a Stanford Professor
and two benefactors of Stanford. Id. Ultimately, after discovery and a motion for summary judgment, the court
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Stewart," the Supreme Court of Delaware similarly noted that non-financial ties
could impede independence and that "[a] variety of motivations, including friendship" could cause bias that would preclude a director from objectively evaluating
the decision at hand. 9 The court, however, made it clear that "[n]ot all friendships,
or even most of them, rise to this level . . . .,6 In Beam, the Delaware Court,
perhaps retreating from Vice Chancellor Strine's opinion in Oracle, reaffirmed that
plaintiffs face significant hurdles in overcoming the presumption that the directors
are independent despite their social ties and personal relationships.6
III.

CONTROLLED COMPANIES

The state definitions of independent directors escape largely unscathed by the federal standards set forth in SOX and the SRO listing standards.62 SOX itself only
regulates public company audit committees, and the independence definitions
under the SRO listing standards largely mirror the minimum standards now employed by courts under state law. Neither the state nor federal definitions of independence, however, adequately deal with the presence of a controlling shareholder.
SOX and the SROs have largely punted on this issue. The SOX references to "independence" with regards to audit committee members do not take shareholder control into account in defining independence, except to create a safe harbor for
directors who themselves own less than 10 percent of the issuer's stock.63 Similarly,
comments to the SRO listing requirements state that a director's share ownership
alone will not bar an independence finding. The comments, however, do not disdismissed the case, utilizing roughly the same rationale that was used by the SLC. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative
Litig., 867 A.2d 904, 908 (Del. Ch. 2004), affd, 872 A.2d 960 (Del. 2005).
58. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).
59. Id. at 1050. To be sure, the procedural posture of the Delaware cases, especially in the context of
derivative suits, makes it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to plead that the directors lack independence when
the allegations involve personal ties rather than family ties. Id. at 1050-52.
60. Id. at 1050; see also Khanna v. McMinn, 2006 WL 1388744 (Del. Ch. 2006) (rejecting sufficiency of
allegations of social and business ties to disprove independence). The definition of independence employed by
the Delaware Courts is not without its critics. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism,
and the Declining Significance of Federal Reforms on State Director Independence Standards, 31 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 381, 409-14 (2005) (criticizing the Delaware courts' failure to consider social science evidence regarding
motivations based upon personal relationships).
61. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1056. Unlike the situation in Oracle Derivative Litigation, where under Zapata v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), members of the SLC are required to demonstrate their independence, in
the context of demand excused derivative litigation like the Beam litigation, the directors enjoy a presumption
of independence. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1054-55.
62. See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 60, at 391-406 (arguing that the federal reforms do "not reflect a significant departure from [the states'] rules and norms"); E. Norman Veasey, Retired Chief Justice of Del., "Musings
from the Center of the Corporate Universe," Remarks at the Section of Business Law Luncheon, American Bar
Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslawlnewsletter/0027/
materials/speech.pdf (arguing that SOX represents only a limited intrusion on Delaware law).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3) (2006). While the SEC provisions provide a safe harbor for the independence
label for directors who themselves own less than 10 percent of the issuer's stock, they do not deal with the
independence puzzle where another shareholder is in control and through that control elects members of the
board. SEC Listing Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(e)(1) (2005).
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cuss the impact of a controlling shareholder on the independence determination.64
In fact, controlled companies are excluded under SRO listing requirements from
the mandates that they have a majority of independent board members and have
compensation and nominating/governance committees comprised solely of independent directors.6"
Under Delaware law, the presence of a majority shareholder may impact the
presumptions that would otherwise apply to the question of director independence,
but only under circumstances where the court finds that the majority control results in domination of the directors. For example, in Beam v. Stewart, the plaintiff,
who was a shareholder in Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. (MSO), brought
a shareholder's derivative suit alleging that Stewart's insider trading activities surrounding her sale of ImClone stock damaged the MSO Corporation in violatation
of Stewart's fiduciary duties.66 The plaintiff shareholder alleged that the MSO directors could not possibly be deemed independent given that Martha Stewart owned
94 percent of MSO's voting stock.67 Accordingly, the plaintiff argued the necessity
of demanding that the MSO Board pursue a corporate claim against Stewart,
thereby allowing the shareholder to proceed with her derivative suit.66 However, the
Supreme Court of Delaware held that "[a] stockholder's control of a corporation
does not excuse presuit demand on the board without particularized allegations of
relationships between the directors and the controlling stockholder demonstrating
that the directors are beholden to the stockholder."69 The court in Beam conceded
that evidence of "irregularities or 'cronyism' in MSO's process of nominating board
members" might persuade the court to rebut the presumption of independence.7"
Conversely, the court noted that evidence of an independent board nominating
committee might strengthen the presumption of independence. The Delaware
Court then, in an unusual error, misstated the impact of the recent NYSE and
NASDAQ listing standards that require listed companies to have independent nominating committees. The court suggested that such committees might insulate the
board members from the domination of the controlling shareholder. 7' As explained
above, neither SRO requires controlled companies to establish board nominating

64. See, e.g., NASDAQ, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 4200 (2005) (definitions of independence); PostSOX NYSE Manual, supra note 23, § 303A.02 (standards for independence).
65. See Post-SOX NYSE Manual, supra note 23, § 303A.00. Controlled companies need not comply with
section 303A.01 (majority of independent directors), section 303A.04 (nominating/governance committee), or
section 303A.05 (compensation committee).
Beam, 845 A.2d at 1044.
Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1052-54.
69. Id. at 1054 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984)).
70. Id. at 1056.
71. Id. at 1056 n.48 (citing New York Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Rule 303A.04 (2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf; NASDAQ Rule 4350(c)(4), NASDAQ Online Manual
(2003), availableat http://nasdaq.complinet.com/nasdaq/display/display.html?rbid= 1705&element-id= 18).
66.
67.
68.
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committees that are independent of the controlling shareholder." The exchanges
apparently view independent directors as monitors only of management, not of
other shareholders.
Perhaps the Delaware Court's refusal to excuse demand based upon Stewart's 94
percent control could be downplayed given the particular procedural posture of the
litigation. The Delaware judiciary appears increasingly frustrated with plaintiffs'
counsel who file generalized pleadings in derivative suits without first availing
themselves of a books and records request under the Delaware statute.73 The procedural posture of the Beam demand-excused derivative litigation and the inherent
presumption of independence given to board members even in controlled corporations may therefore explain the result in Beam and differentiate it from Oracle,
where the burden lay with the SLC to prove independence.74 In other words, the
Beam decision could implicitly be a judicial recognition of the potential mischief
inherent in derivative suits and an attempt to reinforce the strict procedural rules
precedent to bringing such a suit.75 In a later article comparing Beam and Oracle,
Justice Veasey noted that "[t]here were different presumptions, different burdens
and different underlying policies between pre-suit demand in Martha Stewart and
the SLC issues in Oracle."'6
On the other hand, the Delaware courts tend to apply a unitary definition of
independence in a variety of circumstances involving controlling shareholders. For
example, in Kahn v. Tremont Corp., the Court evaluated a special committee's
recommendation involving a merger between a controlled public corporation and
its controlling shareholder. Expressly doubting the independence of committee
members and their advisors due to the interlocking financial connections among
the parties, the court declined to shift the burden to the plaintiff, requiring instead
that the controlling shareholder affirmatively prove the entire fairness of the trans72. See supra text accompanying note 65.
73. In critiquing the plaintiffs generalized pleadings, the court in Beam states: "Both this Court and the
Court of Chancery have continually advised plaintiffs who seek to plead facts establishing demand futility that
the plaintiffs might successfully have used a Section 220 books and records inspection to uncover such facts."
Beam, 845 A.2d at 1056. See also E. Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the New CorporateCulture, 59 Bus.
LAW. 1447 (2004) (noting that Delaware courts have urged plaintiffs to obtain corporate books and records
before filing derivative litigation). Justice Veasey is a retired Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court and
the author of Beam.
74. In Beam, the Court references the Chancery Court opinion in Oracle stating that:
We need not decide whether the substantive standard of independence in an SLC case differs from
that in a presuit demand case. As a practical matter, the procedural distinction relating to the diametrically-opposed burdens and the availability of discovery into independence may be outcome-determinative on the issue of independence.
Beam, 845 A.2d at 1055.
75. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?,7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55,
84-85 (1991); E. Norman Veasey, Seeking a Safe Harborfrom JudicialScrutiny of Directors' Business DecisionsAn Analytical Framework for Litigation Strategy and Counselling Directors, 37 Bus. LAW. 1247, 1260 (1982).
76. Veasey, supra note 62, at 15.
77. 694 A.2d 422, 423-24 (Del. 1997).
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action.7" The factors employed by the court to determine independence, however,
were consistent with existing precedent and largely based on financial conflicts of
interest." Kahn thus supports the general perception that the definition of independence for directors under Delaware law remains fairly constant.
It is probable, therefore, that the statements by the court in Beam may in fact
reflect the Delaware Court's definition of independent directors in general terms,
making the case more problematic." It is unrealistic to expect that board members
in a company such as MSO can act independently under circumstances where the
CEO defendant is a 94 percent shareholder who appointed the members to the
board."' This task is especially difficult under circumstances where the board members and CEO defendant were admitted friends, moving in the same close social
circles. The court's statement that the directors are less likely to "risk his or her
reputation than risk the relationship with the interested director" at worst shows a
lack of understanding of human nature and perhaps of the market in which a
director's reputation matters.82 There is conflicting evidence about whether there is
a market for independent directors at all83 and less evidence still of how such a

78. Id. at 428-30. In non-demand excused derivative cases, there is often a more developed record as to
the true independence of the directors, and even then, fairness is always before the court. The determination of
the director's independence only goes towards the allocation of the burden of persuasion. Id. at 428. In Beam,
the Court referenced this non-derivative suit line of cases, distinguishing them due to "[their] own special
procedural characteristics." Beam, 845 A.2d at 1055 n.45.
79. Kahn, 694 A.2d at 429- 30. In Beam, however, the court implicitly distinguished Kahn as a case involving the function of the committee, not its composition. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1055 n.45. Even a cursory analysis of
Kahn itself, however, reveals that an important component of the court's decision was the lack of independence
of committee members on an absolute scale. Kahn, 694 A.2d at 428-30.
80. A more realistic reading of the Beam decision suggests that it retreats from Oracle and is more in line
with earlier Delaware precedent in rejecting allegations of personal and professional relationships as sufficient
to demonstrate a lack of independence. See, e.g., Crescent/Mach I Partners v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch.
2000); see also In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S'holder Litig., 906 A.2d 808 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd, 906 A.2d 766
(Del. 2006); In re Walt Disney Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998).
81. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1044 n.3.
82. Id. at 1052; see Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-CapturedBoard-The
History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 161 (1996) ("It is always tough to challenge a friend,
particularly when the challenging party may one day, as an officer of another enterprise, end up in the same
position."); Ronald I. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director:An Agenda for Institutional
Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 874-75 (1991) (noting that directors who are financially independent still have
social ties that prevent them from engaging in effective monitoring); Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms and the
Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance,92 IOWA L. Rev. 105 (2006) (arguing that social norms do not adequately constrain corporate directors to act appropriately); Donald C.
Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance With Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 71, 86 (arguing that people tend to give agents an excessive benefit of doubt when attempting to monitor
friends); Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WAsH. U. L.Q. 821, 854- 70
(2004) (reviewing literature on social impediments to independent director actions and concluding that courts
underestimate the value of friendship and collegiality).
83. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 82, at 876 ("[Tjhere is simply no evidence that anything like an
effective market for outside directors exists at all."); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 898, 917, 940-45 (1996) (noting that
while the evidence is far from conclusive, some equivocal findings suggest the existence of a "well-functioning
market for outside directors"). Contra Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
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market (if it did exist) would discipline a compliant outside director. 4 The director's reputation among social peers may be a more powerful motivating force. 5
One must suspect that the pronouncements of Delaware courts are more practical
in nature and intended to preserve the essence of the business judgment rule
against attacks based upon the inevitable prior relationships among board members in public entities.8 6 Nonetheless, taken (and cited) at face value, these statements by the Delaware courts can cause great mischief given the relatively few cases
outside of Delaware (or jurisdictions applying Delaware law) that deal with director
independence in the presence of a controlling shareholder. s7
IV.

A.

GOVERNANCE IN PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

The Federal Mandates

While SOX and its related regulations apply primarily to public companies, the
impact of these reforms has also permeated many private businesses under the
guise of "best practices.""8 At the urging-or even insistence-of their auditors,
lenders, insurance companies and legal advisors, at least some private companies
are adopting changes to their governance structures including the use of independent directors.89 Information about governance structures and practices in private
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1647-49, 1697-1700 (2001) (discussing
the balance between market pressures to govern and internal firm governance).
84.
UTIVE

LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXEC-

COMPENSATION 53-58 (2004) (questioning the ability of market forces to limit managers from entering

interested executive compensation arrangements); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker,
ManagerialPower and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 771
(2002). But see David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1820-22, 1832-35
(2001) (noting that social norms may be enforced against corporate directors through shaming mechanisms).
85. Velasco, supra note 82, at 859 ("To pretend that financial interests are inherently stronger than the
bonds of friendship is both substantively indefensible and morally insulting.").
86. Id. at 844-60.
87. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Greenfield, 764 A.2d 270 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (citing Delaware public corporation cases to help define "interested director"); Einhorn v. Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78 (Wis. 2000) (explaining that
Wisconsin SLC statute derived from MBCA does not differentiate between public and closely held companies).
A recent Indiana decision based upon an MBCA inspired statute endorsed the Delaware view that a board
subcommittee in a public corporation could dismiss shareholder derivative litigation provided it demonstrated
that the committee was disinterested, independent and operated in good faith, but the decision did not delve
into the definition of independence. In re Guidant S'holders Derivative Litig., 841 N.E.2d 571 (Ind. 2006).
88.
JAMES A. DIGABRIELE, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND THE PRIVATE COMPANY DISCOUNT: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 15- 17 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=908061 (presenting evidence that the
private firm discount is higher Post-SOX, and suggesting that the private firms were more negatively impacted
by SOX than public firms).
89. PAUL D. BROUDE, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, THE IMPACT OF SARBANES-OXLEY ON PRIVATE AND NONPROFIT COMPANIES (2006), available at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl-s31 Publications/FileUpload137/351 1/ndi
%202006%20private%20study.pdf (noting that surveys showed that larger companies undertook SOX standards under pressure from auditors); Press Release, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 30% of Fast-Growth Private
Companies Applying Sarbanes-Oxley Principles (June 21, 2005), available at http://www.barometersurveys.
com/production/barsurv.nsf/vwAllNewsByDocD/834B5ECEF36C79C685257026006F2DC7 (30 percent of respondents in survey of CEOs of large, fast growing private firms are adopting some SOX reforms); see also
Jeremy Charles Vanderloo, Comment, EncouragingCorporateGovernance for the Closely Held Business, 24 Miss.
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enterprises is extremely difficult to obtain because private firms face no disclosure
obligations. In January of 2006, Foley & Lardner LLP conducted one of the few
surveys directed to board members in private corporations. This survey found that
86 percent of private company respondents felt that the new federal corporate reform requirements had impacted their companies.90 Over 70 percent of survey respondents reported that they were adopting governance reforms, including the
establishment of independent boards, at the request of auditors (36 percent), customers (14 percent), lenders (13 percent), and/or because they self-imposed the
reforms as a "best practice" (70 percent). 9' Comments by survey participants indicate that they viewed the reforms as a "best practice," were fearful that the reforms
would eventually be imposed upon them by regulators, or that they were preparing
in advance for public company status. In 2005, PricewaterhouseCoopers conducted
a similar survey of CEOs of 346 fast growing private companies. Thirty percent of
the companies in this survey indicated that they had or were planning to voluntarily institute some SOX governance reforms including an independent board.92 The
rationales for those planning to institute SOX reforms included best practices (60
percent), addressing potential problems (59 percent), recommendations of constituencies such as lenders and stockholders (43 percent), and posturing for a potential
sale or IPO (43 percent).
The publication of these survey results predictably resulted in a slew of articles
proclaiming that private companies are adopting many of the SOX inspired governance standards, and suggesting that all private companies get on board.93 In spite of
C. L. REv. 39 (2004) (corporate governance principles of SOX should apply to private as well as public
companies).
90. BROUDE, supra note 89, at 5.
91. Id. at 6. These results were consistent with findings from previous surveys in 2004 and 2005. Id.
92. An independent board was mentioned by 21 percent of those instituting or planning to institute SOX
reforms.
93. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 6; Irvin Brum & Seth I. Rubin, Sarbanes-Oxley: It is Not Just for Public
Companies, RUSKIN, Moscou, FATISCHEK, P.C. (2006), available at http://www.ruskinmoscou.com/article-CGnot-just-for-public-cos.htm (outlining pressures on private firms to adopt SOX governance mandates); Dennis
J. Doucette, What Sarbanes-Oxley Means for Private Companies, Nov. 21, 2003, available at http://www.luce.
com/content.asp?link=384&newsletter id= 133 (providing an overview of SOX's applicability to private companies and board independence generally); James Gentry, Sarbanes-Oxley Impact Extends FarBeyond Public Companies, BUSINESSJOURNAuSM.ORG, June 29, 2006, available at http://www.businessjournalism.orglpageslbizl
2006/06/sarbanesoxley-impactextends-f/ (good corporate practice clearly indicates that private companies
employ independent directors as defined by SROs); Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, Private and Nonprofit
Corporate Governance (2005), available at http://www.hteh.com/news.asp?eventid=185 (overview of SOX's applicability to private companies and board independence generally); Jill Jusko, Sarbanes-Oxley: Private Opportunity In Public Regulation, INDUSTRY WK., Feb. 1, 2006, at 17, available at http://www.industryweek.com/
ReadArticle.aspx?ArticlelD= 11352 (discussing PriceWaterhouseCooper's survey); A. Nagorski, Sarbanes-Oxley
Isn't Just for Public Firms, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Jun. 2006, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mim4153/is_-3_63/ai-n16546009/pgl (private and non-profit companies are adopting SOX reforms to increase
confidence among investors); James M. Pethokoukis, Even Small Fry Might Want to Comply with this Law, U.S.
NEWS AND WORLD REP., Jan. 30, 2006, at 38 (large private companies comply with SOX to maintain exit
strategy flexibility); William M. Sinnett, Even Private Company Boards of Directors Are Changing, FIN. EXEC.,
Oct. 1, 2003, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/business-planning-structures/starting-a-business/671974-
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the publicity engendered by these surveys, however, we cannot read too much into
these results. The Foley & Lardner results were derived from data from 36 for-profit
private companies that responded to the survey.94 The companies were categorized
into "large organizations" defined as those with over $300 million in revenue, and
"small organizations" defined as those with less than $300 million in revenue."
Given the small sample size and lack of further delineation of private companies by
size, it is difficult to accurately assess from the Foley & Lardner data whether this
trend towards independent boards reaches smaller private entities that comprise
the vast majority of private business enterprises in the U.S. 6 The PricewaterhouseCoopers data was derived from so-called "trend-setter" companies that
averaged $46.2 million in revenue and averaged a 387 percent increase in revenue
over the past five years. This is consistent with other evidence that private companies that are adopting SOX principles are the larger entities who may be positioning
themselves for an initial public offering or potential acquisition. 7 A 2003 white
paper by Robert Half International, Inc., however, suggests that smaller companies
may also be impacted if they rely heavily on insurers or lenders, or do business with
governmental entities. The potential for copycat state legislation is another catalyst that may spur private companies to adopt the federal reforms.99 There is per-

1.html (discussing the changing role of the board and the importance of outside directors for private companies, particularly family-owned businesses); Richard A. Wiley, Sarbanes-Oxley Does It Really Apply to NonProfit and Private Corporations?,2006 Bos. B.J. 10 (good corporate practice clearly indicates that private companies employ independent directors as defined by SROs); Perkins Coie LLP, The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on
Private Companies, Sept. 16, 2004, available at http://www.perkinscoie.com/content/ren/updates/corp/091604.
htm (suggesting that private companies interested in "best practices" add independent members to their
boards).
94. Perhaps demonstrating the difficulty of obtaining information on closely held businesses, the Foley &
Lardner survey, while distributed to 9,000 participants in private enterprises, returned only 56 responses, 36
from for-profit enterprises. BROUDE, supra note 89, at 5; see also Eric L. Teksten et al., Boards of Directorsfor
Small Businesses and Small Private Corporations: The Changing Role, Duties and Expectations, 28 MGMT. RES.
NEws 50, 50 (2005) (reporting on results of a pre-SOX survey returning 32 responses from private firms and
concluding that boards' structures in small businesses vary according to the needs of the company).
95.

BROUDE, supra note 89, at 12.

96.

See SMALL Bus. ASS'N, EMPLOYER FIRMS, ESTABLISHMENTS, EMPLOYMENT, AND ANNUAL PAYROLL
SMALL FIRM SIZE CLASSES (2003), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/us_03ss.pdf (showing that
more than 78 percent of United States businesses have nine or fewer employees).
97. Michael Petrecca, Private Companies Voluntarily Adopt Sarbanes-Oxley Principles,Jan. 25, 2006, http://
www.s-ox.com/News/detail.cfm?ArticlelD= 1589; see also Richard S. Savich, Cherry PickingSarbanes-Oxley, 201
J. ACCT. 71 (2006) (discussing why a non-profit or private business may adopt SOX's requirements for public
corporations).
98. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., supra note 6, at 6; see also Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate
Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors' & Officers' Liability InsuranceMarket, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (examining D & 0 underwriting in the public sphere as it relates to metric measuring "good"
corporate governance).
99. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 98, at 14 (discussing states' efforts at passing copycat legislation and
accompanying impact on private companies).
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haps an emerging consensus that independent directors provide a valuable tool for
family business as well." °
The few available surveys concerning the use of independent directors of private
firms do not reveal the respondents' definition of "independence" or whether the
perceived trend of such organizations to utilize outside board members includes
the limitations now embodied in federal regulations. For the reasons outlined below, the wholesale importation of the federal regime makes little if any sense in the
general arena of private firms.
Private companies can certainly benefit from the presence of outside directors,
and more enlightened owners and managers have placed outsiders on their boards
for many years.' The rationale for employing outside board members in private
companies, and thus the role of the board, differs, however, from the dominant
monitoring role that boards are now expected to play in the public arena. Boards of
most private firms operate as advising boards. Directors function on a more collaborative and less adversarial basis than is now expected of their public counterparts.
The private firm directors remain as sounding boards for management and provide
strategic advice utilizing expertise and networking opportunities that might not
otherwise exist in the enterprise. Independence as measured by public company
norms could very well impede these functions of the advising board in a private
enterprise. 02
While the advising role of boards has long been recognized as a paramount function of public as well as private firm directors, it has received relatively little attention in the academic literature, especially when compared to the empirical studies
analyzing the impact of independent monitoring directors.0 3 Literature is only re-

100. Sinnett, supra note 93. But see Suzanne Lane et al., Guidelines for Family Business Boards of Directors, 19
FAM. Bus. REV. 147 (2006) (outlining different considerations when choosing directors of family owned firms).
101. See, e.g., JAMES DARAZSDI, PRIVATE COMPANY BOARDS: RESULTS OF THE 1999 NACD PRIVATE COMPANY
SURVEY (2006), available at http://www.lcvco.com.br/english/docs/Pes-CapFec-NACDI.doc (noting that more
than 60 percent of 165 respondents from companies ranging in size from annual revenue of less than $5
million to more than $1 billion, reported that more than half the board members were not part of management). Darazsdi's finding, however, is not statistically valid given that the membership of NACD consists
primarily of outside board members, meaning that the survey was distributed to a non-representative sample
of companies.
102.

GEORGE S. DALLAS & HAL S. SCOTT, STANDARD & POOR'S, MANDATING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR: CAN

ONE SET OF RULES FIT ALL? (2006), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=907346 (noting the tradeoff between
independence and detailed knowledge concerning company affairs); Doug Raymond, Independence and the
Private Company Board, 29 DIRS. & Bus. 14 (2005), available at http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/files/Publica

36c84b-3a92-4d82-b2O8tion/ec360e2a-Ode3-40dc-8c58-0070486fed2f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ab

05d645b59c3f/Raymond DB_0705.pdf (arguing that federally defined independent directors may hinder the
operation of a private firm).
103. Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN. 217 (2007) (noting the lack
of empirical study and the tradeoffs between the dual roles of board members); Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too 24 (Harv.
Law & Econ. Discussion, Working Paper No. 525, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=808244 (suggesting that the question of whether the board's advising role is threatened by SOX mandates is an empirical
one yet to be answered).
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cently emerging suggesting that the monitoring role of the board may hinder its
advisory role given the rational incentives of management. For example, independent boards by nature must rely heavily upon the CEO for information.' 4 As pressures build for an increasing number of independent directors on public boards,
the information-producing role of the CEO becomes more paramount. Yet, as Adams and Ferreira demonstrate, the manager faces trade-offs in sharing information
with the Board. The more intensely the board wants to monitor the manager rather
than advise her, the greater the incentive for the manager to withhold information,
making board interference less likely. Withholding information, however, impedes
the advisory functions of the board, lessening its value to shareholders.' ° Managers
may be more likely to accept advice from those they know and trust rather than
from those with no personal or financial connection to the firm. 6 Therefore some
scholars argue that a mixed board containing both inside and independent directors may provide a more optimal governance structure for a firm. 7
Another looming danger in applying the federal definition of independent directors to the private realm is the elimination of otherwise qualified directors who can
add value to a closely held firm from the pool of candidates. The federal definition
is thus over-inclusive in excluding those who may have financial or professional ties
to a private entity, but may have knowledge that may be desirable to the company
or connections that may prove useful in advancing a corporation's business interests.' This species of independence may lead to a board populated with ineffective,
largely ignorant directors.0 9

104. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 376.
105. Adams & Ferreira, supra note 103, at 220-38 (modeling problem and suggesting dual boards). Donald
Langevoort similarly suggested that "[ifn
the face of serious monitoring, the CEO will be very careful what she
does or does not tell the outsiders." Langevoort, supra note 5, at 812; see also Charu Raheja, Determinants of
Board Size and Composition, A Theory of Corporate Boards, 40 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIs 283 (2005)
(modeling interaction of firm insiders and outsiders and finding that optimal board structures vary and will
contain a mix of independent and inside directors).
106. The debacle surrounding the Hewlett-Packard "spying" case provides a current example of how distrust among board members can significantly harm a company. See Rex Crum & Peter Waldman, Business
Technology: U.S. Gets Aid Of Detective In H-P Case, WALL ST. I., Jan. 16, 2007, at B5.
107. Langevoort, supra note 5, at 799-800, 805-16.
108. See CARTER & LORSCH, supra note I (noting that independence has to have limits since directors with
no links to the company do not know much about it); see also Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO
L. REV. 265, 267, 281-82 (1997) (arguing that increased independence may come at the cost of management
capacity); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do CorporateLaw and Some of the New Challenges We
(and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 686 (2005) (noting that the move to independent directors will
leave the CEO as the sole decision-maker on company matters as boards will be unable to aid in setting
business strategy).
109. In a recent paper, Jeffrey Gordon argues that in public corporations today, the sole function of the
board is to monitor, and boards can adequately perform that function by utilizing outside performance signals
such as stock prices. Directors in this model therefore need not be conversant on matters internal to the
management of the firm. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). Other scholars, however, suggest that
directors who fail to meet the regulatory independence criteria but have thorough company or industry knowl-
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Finance literature suggests that left to their own devices, firms structure their
boards consistent with the relative costs and benefits of the advising versus the
monitoring roles of the board. While independent monitoring boards have been
increasingly dominant in large public entities over the past twenty years, there is
evidence that before SOX, smaller public firms and firms with higher growth opportunities had less independent boards."' Moreover, recent evidence suggests that
smaller public firms with high managerial ownership tend to have smaller, less
independent boards, perhaps supporting the theory that managerial ownership
(common in private firms) is a suitable proxy for a monitoring board."'
Perhaps not surprisingly, the advising role is what directors like best, what they
think they perform best, and what motivates board service. A recent PricewaterhouseCoopers survey of 1,300 directors of public companies revealed that the
key issues that directors prefer spending time on are industry analysis and strategic
planning, followed closely by other advising functions, such as meeting with key
managers, succession planning, and visiting company sites." 2 Monitoring the performance of insiders ranked very low on directors' list of priorities. l"' While no
systematic data is currently available concerning board motivations and preferences
in private companies, it is not much of a stretch to suspect that in this arena, the
advisory theme will be even stronger.
On one level, the directors' preference to advise managers rather than monitor
them should not engender much angst in the legal academy as it impacts board
choices in the private realm. In most private companies, stock ownership is concentrated in the relatively few people who also manage the firm, thus eliminating or
significantly reducing the agency costs that justify the imposition of independent

edge may in fact provide a better monitoring service. Usha Rodrigues, Let the Money Do the Governing: The
Case for Reuniting Ownership and Control, 9 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 254, 256 (2004).
110. See, e.g., JAMES S. LINCK ET AL., THE DETERMINANTS OF BOARD STRUCTURE (2006), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=729935 (reviewing prior literature and presenting results confirming a strong relationship
between board structure and firm characteristics).
111.

Id.

CORPORATE BD. MEMBER, WHAT DIRECTORS THINK: THE CORPORATE BOARD MEMBER/PRICE112.
WATERHOUSECOOPERS SURVEY (2006), available at http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/

870c33acfc7c57c385256fa3007252cf. Of the respondents to the survey, 60 percent would like to spend more
time discussing the competition, 56 percent indicated they would like to devote more time to strategic planning, and 48 percent needed more time to discuss the industry in general. Id. at 7-8. In addition, 43 percent of
respondents indicated they would like to spend more time meeting key managers and succession planning and
38 percent would like to spend more time visiting company sites. Id. PricewaterhouseCoopers obtained similar
results in its 2005 survey of directors. See CORPORATE BD. MEMBER, WHAT DIRECTORS THINK: THE CORPORATE
BOARD

MEMBER/PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS

SURVEY

(2005),

available at

http://www.pwc.com/extweb/

pwcpublications.nsf/docid/870C33ACFC7C57C385256FA3007252CF/$file/cbm-wdt-2005.pdf.
113. CORPORATE BD. MEMBER (2006), supra note 112. Only 3 percent of respondents indicated they would
like to spend more time on section 404 analysis, and 16 percent of respondents wanted to spend more time
monitoring management. Id.
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directors as monitors in the public sphere." 4 Owner-managers are perhaps the
most effective method to eliminate agency costs. After all, agency costs are generally
understood to result from the inevitable separation of control and ownership in
most public firms."' The presence of a controlling shareholder or shareholder
group, a facet of most private companies in the United States," 6 however, creates a
different kind of agency problem when the interests of those in control conflicts
with minority shareholders. Whatever the efficacy of independent directors as
monitors of controlling shareholders in public companies, in the private arena independence as a proxy for effective monitoring is illusory. In a private company,
even outside directors are ordinarily selected by the inside managers and/or the
controlling shareholder. Seldom do we encounter the mediating influence of a
board nominating committee in any but the very largest of the private entities. In a
closely held enterprise, the stockholders often even dispense with the formality of
director elections due to the predetermined outcome of the endeavor. Undoubtedly, outside directors can perform some useful monitoring signals to institutions,
such as banks that contract with private firms or at least signal the owner's business
acumen in placing outside members on their boards. However, in many private
companies, actions by a nominally independent director that displease the majority
shareholder will generally result in the swift removal of the director from the
board.'
B.

State Law Implications

While the new federalized definition of independence is over-inclusive when applied to outside directors for most private firms, state law definitions may be
under-inclusive. Under state law constructs, the classification of a director as independent is useful only in certain contexts usually involving conflict of interest
transactions. Given the convergence between majority share ownership and managers in private firms, most conflicts occur between those owner/managers and minority shareholders who accuse those in control of appropriating an unfair share of

114. See perhaps the seminal work in this field, the 1983 article of Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983). See also Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 381,
384-86.
115.

See, e.g., JACKY YUK-CHOW, SMALL Bus. AsS'N AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE: EVIDENCE

(2005), available at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs268.pdf (arguing based upon statistical analysis that agency costs do not
exist for smaller firms). See also Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 785, 785 (2003) (arguing that in the arena of public corporations, the presence of a controlling
shareholder reduces agency costs).
116. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHARACTERISTICS OF BUSINESS OWNERS: 2002 (2006), available at http://
www.census.gov/csd/sbo/characteristics2002.htm.
117. The manager's power to eject board members has been extensively studied in the public arena. See
Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directorsand Their Monitoring of
the CEO, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 96 (1998); Vincent A. Warther, Board Effectiveness and Board Dissent: A Model of
the Board's Relationship to Management and Shareholders, 4 j. CORP. FIN. 53, 53-70 (1998).
FROM THE SMALL Bus. FIN. SURVEY DATA BASE, SMALL BUSINESS RESEARCH SUMMARY 1
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firm resources. Reliance upon facially independent board members to validate
these conflict of interest transactions involving corporate insiders (or even to lessen
the appropriate standard of judicial review) is even more problematic for private
companies than in the public arena.
The Delaware court decisions concerning director independence rarely take place
in the context of controlled private corporations given the relatively small number
of closely held corporations domiciled in Delaware." 8 The few Delaware derivative
cases litigated among members of private firms, however, suggest that the Delaware
courts will look to precedent developed in the context of public corporations, even
though there may be principled reasons to differentiate such entities from controlled public companies. " ' Moreover, when opining on the validity of public corporation theories to the private realm in other contexts, the Delaware courts do not
take into account the special nature of private firms absent the corporation's election to avail itself of special statutory treatment under Delaware's close corporation
statute.' 0 Even if it is questionable whether they apply, the pronouncements of
Delaware courts in response to public company litigation permeate the jurisprudence in this field. This suggests that statements by the Delaware courts in cases
involving controlled public corporations will have a nationwide impact on litigation involving private firms. 2'
At present, there are relatively few cases involving private companies that involve
the utilization of independent directors to ratify questionable transactions by those
in control. As the call for private entities to employ independent directors expands,
however, this may become an emerging trend.'22 Most of the few existing private
company cases involve the attempted use of an SLC to dismiss shareholder derivative claims'23 although there are examples involving direct shareholder claims as
24
well.

118. One estimate suggests that in spite of Delaware's dominance in the public incorporation market, less
than 3.5 percent of non-public corporations are incorporated in Delaware. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S.
Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND.L. REV. 1747, 1763 (2004).
119. See, e.g., Beneville v. York, 769 A.2d 80 (Del. Ch. 2000). Similarly, the few reported non-Delaware cases
apply a unified definition of independence to controlled private companies and their public counterparts. See,
e.g.,
Shapiro v. Greenfield, 764 A.2d 270 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (citing Delaware public corporation cases to
help define "interested director"); Einhorn v. Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78 (Wis. 2000) (explaining that Wisconsin
SLC statute derived from MBCA does not differentiate between public and closely held companies).
120. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380-81 (Del. 1993); see also Thompson & Thomas, supra note
118, at 1763 (noting that Delaware is "on the trailing edge among all American jurisdictions" in providing
dispute resolution devices for closely held entities).
121. See, e.g., Allied Ready-Mix v. Allen, 994 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (applying Delaware public
corporation precedents to derivative claim in Kentucky close corporation).
122. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Cronn & Joshua K. Simko, When Should a Board Appoint a Special Committee, 7 OR.
Bus. LAW. 1 (2006) (suggesting that private companies should use SLCs to gain judicial deference to board
decisions that may impact fiduciary duty litigation).
123. See, e.g., Allied Ready-Mix, 994 S.W.2d 4; Bender v. Schwartz, 917 A.2d 142 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007);
Shapiro, 764 A.2d 270; Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d 78.
124. See, e.g., Cutshall v. Barker, 733 N.E.2d 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (shareholders filed direct claims
against individual directors in addition to derivative claims); Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17 (Minn.Ct.
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The following case will serve to illustrate the folly of the bulk transference of
principles designed for public corporations to the private realm. The case was
played out in Oregon, where the corporate statute, like those of the majority of
states, is based upon the MBCA; yet the Oregon courts, like those of many other
jurisdictions, rely on Delaware precedent given its ubiquity.'25 Naito v. Naito2 ' involved a multi-year dividend dispute in a multi-generational family business.' The
plaintiffs alleged that the corporation should have been dissolved under a state
statute providing this remedy under circumstances of oppressive or illegal conduct
by the controlling shareholder.'28 The trial court found evidence of oppression, and
ordered the annual payment of a fixed dividend.' 29 In between the trial court judgment and the appeal, the controlling shareholder (with the advice of counsel who
had lost at trial) had his board adopt a dividend policy that included the creation of
a dividend subcommittee consisting of non-family outside directors. "' The policy
provided that the "independent directors" would solicit input from all stakeholders
including minority shareholders before recommending a dividend to the full board,
which was under the control of the majority shareholder.'' The Oregon Court of
Appeals rejected the defense argument that the new policy eradicated the trial
court's finding of oppression, but reversed the fixed dividend remedy imposed by
the trial court in order to give the newly created dividend policy time to work.'
The Oregon appellate court, parroting business judgment rule rhetoric, stated that
it was reluctant to impose its judicial will upon the board.' In the years following
the litigation, the minority shareholders continued to complain of oppression resulting from activities of the controlling shareholders, including low dividends,
misrepresentations from the insiders to the board, and increased compensation for
insiders.

App. 1995) (shareholder brought both direct and derivative claims against the corporation and board of directors). Some courts do not hold close corporation shareholders to the strict procedural niceties that differentiate
derivative and direct suits. See, e.g., Durham v. Durham, 871 A.2d 41 (N.H. 2005).
125. See, e.g., Loewen v. Galligan, 882 P.2d 104, 111-12 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (looking to Delaware law to
resolve shareholder standing issue); Robert C. Art, Takeover Legislation: Oregon's Four Approaches to Corporate
Protection, 30 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 223, 233 (1994) (noting lack of Oregon law on the subject and looking to
Delaware precedents).
126.

35 P.3d 1068 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).

127. See Robert C. Art, Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close Corporations:Oppression,FiduciaryDuties,
and Reasonable Expectations, 28 J. CORP. L. 371, 398-401 (2003) (describing the genesis of the Naito litigation).
128. OR. REV. STAT. § 60.661 (2005). The cause of action for shareholder oppression was well established in
Oregon at this time. See generallyArt, supra note 127, at 374-404 (discussing the moorings for and interpretations of "oppression" in dissolution statutes).
129.

Naito, 35 P.3d at 1076-78.

130.

Id. at 1077.

131.

Id.

Id. at 1084.
133. The court stated that while the Oregon courts "[would] not ignore corporate misconduct, it is not
their role to second-guess business decisions that are within the range of reasonableness." Id. at 1083.
132.
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Three years after the court of appeals decision, now referred to as Naito I, the
parties were back in court.'34 Among the myriad issues litigated in the second trial
(Naito II) was the impact of the so-called independent directors' dividend recommendations. 3 Citing Aronson v. Lewis, defense counsel argued that the utilization
of an independent dividend committee made the dividend decision immune from
judicial review, except under the business judgment rule.'36 Aronson, as explained
above, established the standard of independence under Delaware law for demand
excused derivative litigation, beginning with the presumption of independence.'
Assuming the applicability of the Aronson standard to a claim of minority oppression in a private corporation, 8 the burden would fall on the plaintiff to prove that
the dividend committee was not independent. Under Delaware law, the independence question turns on whether the directors' decisions are compromised by "extraneous considerations or influences"' 39 rendering the director "incapable of acting
independently for some other reason such as domination or control."'4 ° While initially established in Aronson, these definitions of independence appear to be consistent with definitions used in other contexts by the Delaware courts that considered
the independence of the directors. 4 ' As explained above, under Delaware precedent, the presence of a controlling shareholder does not, without more, negate
independence.' 42
The plaintiffs argued that because the majority shareholders personally appointed the outside directors to the board and dominated the board decisions, the
outside directors were not independent. Perhaps underscoring the difference be-

134. Ironically, the Naito board declared dividends in the amount ordered by the trial court in Naito I, and
only the appellate court's reversal of the original trial court order paved the path for future litigation.
135. Naito v. Naito (Naito II), Case No. 0210-10929 (Multnomah County Cir. Ct. 2004). The author served
as an expert witness in Naito II.
136. Id.
137. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-15 (Del. 1984); see also supra notes 40, 69 and accompanying
text.
138. In Oregon, a claim for oppression of minority shareholders requires an allegation of wrongdoing on
the part of those controlling the entity. See, e.g., Art, supra note 127, at 375. This generally amounts to a finding
of a conflict of interest transaction by the majority shareholder. In some jurisdictions, the oppression suit can
proceed without a showing of wrongdoing by the majority. See, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, ShareholderOppression &
Reasonable Expectations: Of Change, Gifts, and Inheritances in Close Corporation Disputes, 86 MINN. L. REV. 717,
746-47 (2002).
139. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815-16.
140. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996), overruled in part on other grounds by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
141. See supra notes 66-81 and accompanying text; see, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000)
(referencing derivative cases when analyzing independence in a class action that challenged the sale of a
company).
142. See supra notes 66-87 and accompanying text; see also Brehm, 746 A.2d at 257 (stating proper demand
futility inquiry was whether the directors were "incapable, due to personal interest or domination and control,
of objectively evaluating a demand"); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 (noting how the allegation that the defendant
dominated and controlled the board because he owned 47 percent of company's outstanding stock and personally selected other directors was insufficient absent additional facts demonstrating "that through personal or
other relationships the directors are beholden to the controlling person .... ).
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tween derivative suits and other kinds of litigation, however, the determination of
the independence question in the Naito II litigation took place after discovery and
trial. Facts uncovered by plaintiffs in Naito II indicated that prior "independent"
directors, who did not accede to the majority shareholder's wishes when it came to
dividend decisions, were replaced with more accommodating nominees. These are
the kinds of facts that even the Beam court recognized could impede independence,
especially given the majority shareholder's complete control over the board member selection process.' 43 In the context of most controlled private companies, the
directors face enormous implicit (if not explicit) pressures to conform to the will of
the majority shareholder who appointed them to the board.
The next inquiry, even assuming the presence of independent directors, involved
the appropriate standard of judicial review. The Naito II defendants argued that the
dividend decision by the outside directors should be accorded a business judgment
rule review under Aronson and the prior Delaware (and Oregon) decisions applying
this limited judicial review to dividend decisions outside of the shareholder oppression arena.' Like the defendants, the plaintiffs based their arguments in large part
upon Delaware precedent involving public corporations. The plaintiffs argued that
the dividend decision, when coupled with the activities that arguably constituted
oppression, should be deemed a conflict of interest transaction involving a controlling shareholder and analyzed under the fairness test in Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc. 4 and its progeny. Under Kahn, fairness is always before the court
and the presence of independent decision-makers merely shifts the burden of proof
to the plaintiffs to prove that the decisions were unfair.'46 The ultimate court decision on both the director independence question and the appropriate standard of
review remained in extreme doubt throughout the proceedings.'47 In the end, the
court rejected the defense contentions, engaged in a fairness review, and found that
the majority had engaged in oppressive conduct. The court ordered the company
dissolved unless the parties could settle their differences.' 48

143. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1051 (Del. 2000); Lewis v. Aronson, No. 6919, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L.
243, 248-57 (Del. Ch. May 1, 1985) (on remand) (holding that demand was excused because the plaintiff's
amended complaint alleged sufficient specific facts where it suggested that outside directors were under the
control of a 47 percent shareholder).
144. Traditionally, dividend decisions were viewed as board decisions protected by the business judgment
rule even in close corporations where the independence of the board was in doubt. It seemed to be a consensus
view in Naito H that a business judgment rule review would result in a defense victory given that the dividend
decision was at least rational. Defendants could have (but did not) also relied upon more closely analogous
Delaware conflict of interest cases arising under Delaware Rule 144, which closely tracks the Oregon conflict of
interest statute based upon the MBCA. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 60.001-.992 (2005).
145. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
146. Ultimately the parties settled and divided the company assets among the litigants. Wendy Culverwell,
Battle-weary Naitors Agree to Split Company, PORTLAND Bus. J., Jan. 21, 2005, available at http://portland.
bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2005/01/ 17/daily5O.html.
147. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1120-21.
148. Moreover, the dividend decision at hand was actually made by the majority-controlled board, not the
independent directors.
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The Naito II litigation serves to highlight the frustration in attempting to apply
public company jurisprudence to the private realm. Oregon is not generally known
as a bastion of corporate law, yet in Oregon, there are more than two dozen appellate opinions involving the relative rights of participants in non-public corpora"
tions. 49
' Nonetheless, Delaware decisions involving public corporations provided
the fodder for the parties' and ultimately the court's legal analysis. As the statutory
and judicial underpinnings of minority shareholder oppression suits continue to
grow, well-advised companies may follow the lead of the Naito Company by utilizing outside directors to legitimize dividend, employment, and other decisions that
impact minority shareholders.' Judicial decisions concerning the deference to afford the judgments of such outside board members should be informed by considerations relevant to closely held entities and not by unfiltered extrapolation from
public corporations where quite different policy rationales prevail.'' The independence definition should necessarily vary according to the special nature of private
firms with the recognition of the probable necessity of more intensive judicial
review.
V.

CONCLUSION

The SOX and SRO mandates towards greater board independence attempt to dictate a more active policing role for directors of public corporations. This role may
not only be inappropriate for directors of private companies, but it is also largely
illusory given the complete power the majority shareholder exerts over the firm and
the board. There is a danger, however, that private firms may attempt to clothe
suspicious transactions with the appearance of propriety by employing directors
who meet the federal standards of independence. These definitions based solely
upon financial or familial conflicts of interest miss the mark by ignoring the very
real personal pressures that directors may face to support the decisions of those
controlling the corporation. Similarly, the public company jurisprudence provided
by the courts of Delaware provides an under-inclusive definition of independence
as applied to directors in a private firm.
The real value that outside directors bring to a private entity is advisory or relational. Here, the definitions of independence in the federal scheme are over-inclusive as a benchmark to measure desirable outside directors. The federal definitions
may preclude those from board service who may add value to a firm in an advisory
role given their firm or industry knowledge and their connections. The new federal
149. Art, supra note 127, at 373 n.9 (listing cases through 2002).
150. Cronn & Simko, supra note 122, at 3-4.
151.
Scholarly work on the governance dynamics in controlled entities lags far behind the scholarly work
studying widely held public firms that remain dominant in the U.S. With the emergence of a global market,
scholars are turning attention to controlled public firms that predominate outside the U.S. and the U.K. See,
e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, ControllingShareholdersand Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (2006). More work is needed in the arena of controlled private firms.
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independence standards are problematic for public firms that have no choice-and
if of questionable benefit to the goose, they are truly inappropriate for the gander.
Calls for private firms to voluntarily adopt the newly federalized independence regime as "best practices" are ill advised.
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